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Legacies of the Nuremberg SS-
Einsatzgruppen Trial after 70 Years 
HILARY EARL* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
War crimes trials are almost commonplace today as the normal 
course of events that follow modern-day wars and atrocities. In the 
North Atlantic, we use the liberal legal tradition to redress the harm 
caused to civilians by the state and its agents during periods of State and 
inter-State conflict. The truth is, war crimes trials are a recent invention. 
There were so-called war crimes trials after World War I, but they were 
not prosecuted with any real conviction or political will. The Soviets 
prosecuted war criminals beginning in 1943, but many of these trials 
lacked the markers of western justice; the most important, of course, is 
the presumption of innocence. 
By this measure, Nuremberg was the first real (and successfully 
prosecuted) war crimes trial held in the North Atlantic. As with many 
things in history, the first is often the most important. Nuremberg prose-
cuted representatives of the German State for crimes committed by the 
State, in what the Allies called “crimes against peace.” Simply put, Nu-
remburg prosecuted high-ranking German officials for waging an ag-
gressive and illegal war. It has been argued that for these reasons, Nu-
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testimony, and the cultural impact of the Holocaust and genocide in the twenty-first century. She 
has published in a variety of journals and essay collections and is the author of The Nuremberg 
SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, 1945-1958: Atrocity, Law, and History,published by Cambridge Uni-
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remberg stands out as significant. It set a legal precedent for all other 
trials that followed, including the twelve subsequent Nuremberg trials, 
or Nuremberg Military Tribunals (“NMT”), prosecuted between 1946 
and 1949, the 1961 Israeli trial of Adolf Eichmann, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and Internation-
al Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), and even the domestic tri-
bunals in Guatemala and Germany, which prosecuted State agents as 
accessories to murder and other atrocities. All of these, some scholars 
argue, have their origins in the 1945 International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (“IMT”). 
This essay discusses one of the IMT’s legal legacies: the Nurem-
berg SS-Einsatzgruppen trial, the ninth of the twelve NMT prosecuted 
by the Americans at the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg between 1946 
and 1949. The Einsatzgruppen were special paramilitary forces of the 
Schutzstaffel (“SS”) that worked alongside the German army to kill the 
racial enemies of the Reich. It is estimated they deliberately murdered 
between 1.1 and 1.5 million innocent Jewish men, women and children. 
The “Einsatzgruppen Reports,” discovered in 1946, contained damning 
evidence of criminal wrongdoing, and in the summer of 1947, Telford 
Taylor—the head of the American Office of Chief of Counsel of War 
Crimes (“OCCWC”)—indicted two dozen group leaders for crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and membership in organizations declared 
criminal by the IMT.1 These defendants were not tried for crimes 
against peace. In some ways, as Kim Priemel has noted, the 
Einsatzgruppen trial is not technically a “war crimes trial,” but rather an 
atrocity trial.2 
Responsible for carrying out the Nazi policy for “extermination” in 
the east, many of these men were extremely well educated professionals 
who had come to the mobile killing units by way of the Security Service 
(“SD”) offices. None of the defendants were rank-and-file members of 
the Einsatzgruppen.3  Michael Musmanno, a judge in the Superior Court 
of Pennsylvania and a controversial figure at Nuremberg, presided over 
the court, which was in session for 138 days. Thousands of pieces of ev-
idence were reviewed and every defendant testified about their behavior 
 
1. See generally Amended Indictment, July 29, 1947, IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 
13–22 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office Oct. 1946–Apr. 1949). 
 2. Kim Christian Priemel, War Crimes Trials, the Holocaust and Historiography, 1944–
2014, in THE WILEY-BLACKWELL COMPANION TO THE HOLOCAUST (Simone Gigliotti & Hilary 
Earl eds., forthcoming 2017). 
 3. See MICHAEL WILDT, GENERATION DES UNBEDINGTEN. DAS FÜHRUNGSKORPS DES 
REICHSSICHERHEITSHAUPTAMTES (4th ed. 2003). 
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during the war.4 After much consideration of the evidence, the tribunal 
found all but one of the defendants guilty of crimes against humanity 
for their part in the murder of an estimated one million civilians.5 Four-
teen defendants received the death penalty, seven received prison sen-
tences, and one defendant was released with time served.6 With the ex-
ception of an unusually large number of death sentences, on the face of 
it, this trial seems no different than any of the other Nuremberg trials—
or was it? 
Here, I suggest that in the context of the postwar period, the 
Einsatzgruppen trial had a significant and lasting impact on our under-
standing of the Holocaust, the European-wide murder of Jews. Unlike 
the IMT, the Einsatzgruppen trial more closely resembles modern day 
“perpetrator trials.” That is, trials designed to deal exclusively with in-
dividuals whose criminal activity was their participation in atrocities 
committed against non-combatants or civilians. Whereas the IMT trial 
focused mainly on the charge of crimes against peace, the Einsatzgrup-
pen trial focused on crimes against humanity, making it a template for 
later atrocity trials including those of major perpetrators such as: Adolf 
Eichmann (1961), Slobodan Milošević (2006) and Radovan Karadžić 
(2016). Lawrence Douglas has referred to this shift away from the 
crimes committed by a State against another State and crimes against 
peace, toward crimes committed against civilians as the “atrocity para-
digm.” Today, the atrocity paradigm “dominates international criminal 
law.”7 Unlike the first Nuremberg trial or IMT which prosecuted former 
Nazis for crimes against peace, the Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen trial, 
one of the twelve NMT, focused almost exclusively on the “Final Solu-
tion to the Jewish Question” and the role of the defendants in their mur-
der. From opening to closing statement, the Einsatzgruppen trial was 
devoted to constructing a narrative of Nazi genocide—defined by the 
prosecution as the deliberate and systematic targeting and murder of the 
 
 4. See HILARY EARL, THE NUREMBERG SS-EINSATZGRUPPEN TRIAL, 1945–1958: 
ATROCITY, LAW, AND HISTORY 217–52 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009); see also Michael A. 
Musmanno, in THE PAPERS OF JUSTICE MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with Gumberg Library, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) [hereinafter MMP].  
 5. The prosecution used the reports of the Einsatzgruppen to estimate the number of civil-
ians killed. This number is contested today. See Id. at 81–83.  
 6. Sentences, IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 587–89 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office Oct. 
1946–Apr. 1949). 
 7. LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, From IMT to NMT: The Emergence of a Jurisprudence of 
Atrocity, in REASSESSING THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 
TRIAL NARRATIVES, AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 288 (Kim Christian Priemel & Alexa Stiller eds., 
Berghahn 2012). 
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Jewish population in the occupied territories that culminated in their to-
tal extermination—and the Einsatzgruppen’s role in it. It was a simple 
and powerful story in which Hitler’s hatred of the Jews as expressed in 
his own speeches, writings, and anti-Jewish policies, and his 1941 or-
ders to the SS—the so-called Führerbefehl—led directly to the murder 
of European Jews. The villains in this story were hybrid perpetrators; 
men who gave orders to kill and who ensured these orders were carried 
out in the field. 
Unlike later trials where the “Miranda rule” was in effect, the guilt 
of the Einsatzgruppen leaders was never questioned because many of 
them confessed to their crimes either in pre-trial interrogations or on the 
witness stand in open court. For those who did not confess, there was an 
abundance of documentary evidence penned by their own hand to prove 
their atrocious deeds. The evidence was so overwhelming in this trial 
that it was, as chief prosecutor Benjamin Ferencz noted, an “open and 
shut” case. 
For a trial of such historic dimensions, it was not well planned. At 
the eleventh hour, a small but dedicated group of lawyers, researchers, 
and interrogators worked at a frantic pace to put the case against the 
Einsatzgruppen leaders together, and by the summer of 1947, they had 
decided that of the two to three thousand members, twenty-four of the 
highest-ranking leaders of the groups would be indicted.8 Why so few? 
For the same reason that all the NMT were capped at twenty-four—
because there were no more seats in the courtroom and the Nuremberg 
prosecutors were not interested in trying rank-and-file members of the 
groups—only the leaders were of interest.9  The number of defendants 
in the dock, however, is not nearly as significant as who was prosecut-
ed. 
Here, I argue that our historical and legal understandings of the 
“Final Solution” and the Einsatzgruppen’s role in it were shaped by the 
trial and its participants. The prosecutors and the way they conceived of 
the role of the Einsatzgruppen in the Holocaust contributed to subse-
quent historical interpretations, especially our understanding of how the 
genesis of the Final Solution was articulated by lead defendant, Otto 
Ohlendorf, whose narrative of the events still has currency today. In the 
absence of documentary evidence, Ohlendorf’s testimony established a 
version of the Final Solution that was clearly hierarchical and premedi-
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Speech at the McGill Conference on Human Rights (Nov. 3–4, 
1987), in THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ (transcript available in U.S. Holocaust Mem’l 
Museum archives), http://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn508277. 
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tated; elements of the crime have become codified in the crime of geno-
cide. According to Ohlendorf, Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich were at the 
center of the decision-making process, and the members of the killing 
units had little or no agency. They were, as Ohlendorf told his captors, 
simply following orders.10 His co-defendants reinforced the obedience to 
superior orders defense as, one by one, they took the stand and told the 
court that even though they deeply respected Hitler, they had no power 
to alter his decisions. They were, as one defendant significantly noted, 
“small wheel[s] in a large machinery” with no choice but to obey.11 The 
idea that the murder of the Jews was a large and complex bureaucratic 
process carried out by the SS and SD on the orders of Hitler was per-
suasive, influencing some of the most prominent postwar scholars.12 The 
trial especially influenced the work of Raul Hilberg, who used the rec-
ords of the Einsatzgruppen trial to explain the machine-like nature of 
the destruction process.13 This view of the events of World War II has 
helped shape our legal and historical understanding of genocide and its 
corporate structure. 
II. COLLECTING EVIDENCE 
In 1946, when the Americans decided to undertake the additional 
twelve Nuremberg trials, they did so with a clear sense of which Nazi 
agencies they wanted to hold accountable. They targeted the SS, Gesta-
po, Security Service and representatives from finance and industry, and 
made concerted efforts to locate evidence against specific people and 
groups.14 Defendants’ selections for prosecution depended largely on the 
 
 10. Testimony of Werner Braune (November 25, 1947), in RECORDS OF THE UNITED 
STATES NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS, microformed on Nat’l Archives Microfilm Publ’n 
M895, roll 13, United States of America v. Otto Ohlendorf 3035, 3047–48 (Nat’l Archives & 
Records Admin.). 
 11. Id.  
 12. See generally GERALD REITLINGER, THE FINAL SOLUTION: THE ATTEMPT TO 
EXTERMINATE THE JEWS OF EUROPE, 1939–1945 (Vallentine, Mitchell, 1st ed. 1953); LÉON 
POLIAKOV, HARVEST OF HATE: THE NAZI PROGRAM FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JEWS OF 
EUROPE (Syracuse Univ. Press 1954); HELMUT KRAUSNICK & MARTIN BROSZAT, ANATOMY OF 
THE SS STATE (Dorothy Long & Marian Jackson trans., Paladin 1973).  
 13. RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (1961) (Raul Hilberg used 
nearly forty thousand prosecution documents including documents from the Einsatzgruppen trial 
to write his masterful, The Destruction of the European Jews (1961)); see also RAUL HILBERG, 
THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: THE JOURNEY OF A HOLOCAUST HISTORIAN 70 (Ivan R. Dee 1996) 
(Hilberg’s revised English edition was published in 1985 as 3 volumes and is slightly different 
than the original. This essay uses the 1961 English edition).   
 14. See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON 
THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 79–80 (U.S. 
Gov’t Printing Office 1949). 
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evidence available and whether the individual was in allied custody. In 
the case of the Einsatzgruppen, there was never any intention to prose-
cute this branch of the SS because no one was all that familiar with their 
activities. 
Though unfamiliar with the Einsatzgruppen during their initial in-
vestigations in late 1945, the Americans soon learned of its crimes by 
one of its foremost members, SS-Brigadeführer Otto Ohlendorf, who 
was head of Office III of the RSHA, Undersecretary in the Economics 
Ministry, and leader of Einsatzgruppe D, which operated behind enemy 
lines in the south of Ukraine, Bessarabia, and the Crimea. The British 
arrested Ohlendorf in May 1945 and interrogated him repeatedly until 
they transferred him to American custody in October.15 Ohlendorf was 
not easily rattled and seldom incriminated himself. It was not until Au-
gust that he actually admitted to his role as leader of Einsatzgruppe D. 
British intelligence reports suggest they were not interested in prosecut-
ing Ohlendorf for his crimes as leader of a mobile killing unit. Rather, 
they viewed him as a good source of information against other higher-
ranking, and thus more important, Nazis. When the Americans asked to 
have Ohlendorf transferred to their custody to question him about some 
of the major war criminals then being prosecuted before the IMT—
especially in the case against Ernst Kaltenbrunner who Ohlendorf knew 
quite well from his work in the RSHA—the British were more than 
willing to oblige.16 
While Ohlendorf was in captivity, he was interrogated over and 
over about the crimes of the regime. It was during this time that the 
Americans first understood the scope and systematic nature of 
Einsatzgruppen criminal activities. They learned that the Einsatzgrup-
pen were special para-military task forces of the SS (not trained military 
personnel) who were used in all military campaigns to assist the Ger-
man army in “pacifying” the civilian population. Their campaign in the 
Soviet-occupied territory required that they follow the German army in-
to conquered areas, identify and round-up enemies of the Reich, strip 
them of their valuables, kill them in open-air shootings, and dispose of 
the victims’ bodies.17 Ohlendorf told the British that they employed mo-
 
 15. Hillary Earl, Confessions of Wrong-doing or how to save yourself from the Hangman: 
An Analysis of British and American Intelligence Reports of the Activities of SS-
Einsatzgruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf, May–December 1945, in SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND THE 
HOLOCAUST 301–26 (David Bankier ed., Enigma Books, Yad Vashem 2006). 
 16. EARL, supra note 4, at 50, 53–54; see also PETER BLACK, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER: 
IDEOLOGICAL SOLDIER OF THE THIRD REICH (Princeton Univ. Press 1984). 
 17. Summary, Morning Interrogation of Otto Ohlendorf (October 24, 1945), in 
INTERROGATION RECORDS PREPARED FOR WAR CRIMES PROCEEDINGS AT NUREMBERG 1945–
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bile gas vans to asphyxiate Jews, mainly women and children, begin-
ning in December 1941; prior to that, men, women and children were 
treated the same.18 He also told the British about his role in the killing 
process in August 1945, and he divulged the same to the Americans 
when he was transferred to their custody in October.19 Not knowing he 
might have to answer for his own wartime actions,20 Ohlendorf freely 
confessed that the mobile unit he commanded was responsible for the 
deaths of ninety thousand people, the overwhelming majority of whom 
were Soviet Jews.21 Ohlendorf also stated these facts for the public rec-
ord when he testified at the IMT in January 1946.22 Even after his con-
fessions of wrongdoing, however, American authorities were uncertain 
about what to do with Ohlendorf. Some wanted to try him for his 
crimes; others simply wanted to use him for his knowledge against 
those they perceived to be more important Nazis.23 One prosecutor not-
ed: 
A careful review of the material evidence on hand in Nuremberg reveals 
few personalities against whom a prima facie case can be made out. To 
date, only two personalities have been discovered to-wit: Otto Ohlendorf 
and Adolph [sic.] Eichmann who could be prosecuted by using the evi-
dence now in the Nurnberg files. . . . Ohlendorf has thus far proven to be 
a mind of information on all phases of the RSHA and other personalities 
 
1947, OCCPAC INTERROGATIONS, microformed on Nat’l Archives Microfilm Publ’n M1270, roll 
13 (Nat’l Archives & Records Admin.); Memorandum from Lt. Col. S. W. Brookhart to Col. 
Amen (October 24, 1945), in INTERROGATION RECORDS PREPARED FOR WAR CRIMES 
PROCEEDINGS AT NUREMBERG 1945–1947, OCCPAC INTERROGATIONS, microformed on Nat’l 
Archives Microfilm Publ’n M1270, roll 13 (Nat’l Archives & Records Admin.) (discussing the 
interrogation of Ohlendorf). 
 18. Summary, Morning Interrogation of Otto Ohlendorf, supra note 17, at 14:30-17:00; 
Summary, Evening Interrogation of Otto Ohlendorf (October 24, 1945), in INTERROGATION 
RECORDS PREPARED FOR WAR CRIMES PROCEEDINGS AT NUREMBERG 1945–1947, OCCPAC 
INTERROGATIONS, microformed on Nat’l Archives Microfilm Publ’n M1270, roll 15–16 (Nat’l 
Archives & Records Admin.) (in this interrogation, Ohlendorf said Einsatzgruppe D used the gas 
vans only in the spring of 1942).  
 19. See EARL, supra note 4, at 49–58 (discussing Ohlendorf’s confessions to the British in 
the summer of 1945). 
 20. LEON GOLDENSOHN, THE NUREMBERG INTERVIEWS: AN AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIST’S 
CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DEFENDANTS AND WITNESSES 390 (Robert Gellately ed., Alfred A. 
Knopf 2004) (Dr. Leon Goldensohn, one of the Nuremberg psychiatrists who interviewed Ohlen-
dorf concluded that he was remorseless and his “conscience, if it can be called such, is clean as a 
whistle and as empty”). 
 21. Summary, Evening Interrogation of Otto Ohlendorf, supra note 18, at 5–6; EARL, supra 
note 4, at 52–53, 71–72. 
 22. Testimony of Otto Ohlendorf (January 3, 1946), IV TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 
1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 319 (Nuremberg, 1947). 
 23. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 80. 
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in the Third Reich. As a matter of expediency, it is thought best to post-
pone any trial of this individual until all information, he is able to give, 
has been obtained from him.24 
That time came in early 1947, when the OCCWC located and analyzed 
a near complete set of the field reports of the Einsatzgruppen. 
Unlike the other trials that formed the OCCWC’s original roster, 
the Einsatzgruppen trial was ad hoc and in response to hitherto un-
known, or at least, misunderstood crimes that were discovered in fits, 
beginning with Ohlendorf’s confessions in 1945 and ending with an 
analysis of the Einsatzgruppen field reports by American researchers 
from March to April 1947. Because the reports were the main evidence 
against the defendants (other than confessions and affidavits), the pros-
ecutors had to read and analyze each in order to determine who was re-
sponsible and for what crime. Each report contained pertinent infor-
mation about who was killed, where, and by which Kommando. Yet, as 
detailed as the reports were, the specific identity of the killers was not 
revealed anywhere within them. 
Inadequate evidence against individual Einsatzgruppen personnel 
prompted American prosecutors to approach the Soviets for help in their 
case.25 The Americans specifically looked for “further evidence and ac-
counts of witnesses from the territories and population” that had come 
face-to-face with units of the Einsatzgruppen.26 Along with evidence 
that might link individuals to the crimes they committed, the Americans 
sought Germans in Soviet custody who could help further their case. 
American efforts came to naught and prosecutors had to come up with 
alternate ways to prove individual guilt. Thus, it was up to the prosecu-
tors to establish defendants’ individual responsibility. The prosecution’s 
decision has had lasting consequences on our historical understanding 
of the Final Solution in the Soviet Union. 
III. THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE INDIRECT CHARGE OF GENOCIDE 
Through close scrutiny of the field reports, the prosecution noted 
 
 24. Memorandum from P.W. Walton (Sept. 30, 1946) (on file with Nat’l Archives & Rec-
ords Admin., Record Group 238, Entry 202, Box 2, folder 3). The author would like to thank Kim 
Priemel for kindly sharing this document with her. 
 25. Memorandum from Frederic S. Burin to Henry Sachs, Chief, SS-Section Berlin Branch, 
OCCWC (March 5, 1947) (on file with Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Record Group 238, 
Entry 202, Box 4, folder 1); Memorandum from Benjamin Ferencz to Col. Gen. Serov, Com-
mander in Chief, Civil Administration of Germany, Berlin-Karlshorst (March 12, 1947) (on file 
with Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Record Group 238, Entry 202, Box 4, folder 1). I want to 
thank Alexa Stiller for sharing these documents with me. 
 26. Id.  
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that between May 1941 and July 1943, the Einsatzgruppen were respon-
sible for the murder of approximately 1 million people.27 The indictment 
stated that four units of approximately 500-800 men each were formed 
under Himmler’s orders, with the “primary purpose” of exterminating 
“Jews . . . and other elements of the civilian population regarded as ra-
cially ‘inferior’ or ‘politically undesirable’” and that these murders were 
“part of a systematic program of genocide.”28 
Genocide is a corporate crime and to carry it out requires many 
different types of perpetrators. At trial, who did the killings and who did 
the jobs that facilitated the killings were not discussed. Thus, four 
groups of approximately two to three thousand individuals were identi-
fied, rounded-up, robbed, shot, killed, and buried in a little less than two 
years remained the mistakenly accepted wisdom for years. Today, we 
know that the murder of one million people was accomplished with the 
help of many thousands of local peoples—from teenagers who helped 
pack down dead bodies to adult men who identified and rounded up po-
tential victims—as well as large groups of reinforcements sent by 
Himmler to help in the actual killing process.29 
Until the historiographical turn, which began with the publication 
of Christopher Browning’s path-breaking Ordinary Men in 1992, the 
role of the Order Police in the killing operations on the eastern front, for 
instance, was not well understood.30 Since the publication of Karl 
Berkoff’s 2004 Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under 
Nazi Rule, his current research on Babi Yar, and Patrick Desbois’s The 
Holocaust by Bullets, we have begun to see a more complete picture of 
those who participated in the killing process.31 Discovering the full ex-
tent of the Einsatzgruppen trial has been a slow process that continues 
today, a clear indication that this trial has had a significant and lasting 
impact on our historical consciousness.32 
 
 27. Amended Indictment, supra note 1, at 15–21 (Count One—Crimes Against Humanity).  
 28. Id. at 15. 
 29. PATRICK DESBOIS, THE HOLOCAUST BY BULLETS: A PRIEST’S JOURNEY TO UNCOVER 
THE TRUTH BEHIND THE MURDER OF 1.5 MILLION JEWS 83–86 (Palgrave MacMillan 2009). 
 30. CHRISTOPHER BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 AND 
THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND (Harper Perennial 1992). 
 31. KAREL BERKHOFF, HARVEST OF DESPAIR: LIFE AND DEATH IN UKRAINE UNDER NAZI 
RULE (Harv. Univ. Press 2004); see also Karel Berkhoff, Babi Yar in History and Memory 
(Working Paper), http://www.niod.nl/en/projects/babi-yar-history-and-memory. 
 32. HILBERG, supra note 13, at 321 (Hilberg used the records from the Einsatzgruppen trial 
to write Destruction and although he does note that auxiliary units were employed in the east, he 
gives the impression that it was the Einsatzgruppen alone who operated in the Soviet Union); see 
also Hans Heinrich Wilhelm, DIE EINSATZGRUPPE A DER SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI UND DES SD 
1941/42 (Frankfurt 1996) (detailed discussion about the composition of Einsatzgruppe A and how 
they recruited helpers).  
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While the OCCWC formulated the indictment based on infor-
mation it gleaned from the Einsatzgruppen reports, it did not contain 
any novel legal charges. Like virtually all twelve NMT, it charged the 
defendants with war crimes, membership in organizations declared 
criminal by the IMT, and crimes against humanity.33 Given the emphasis 
on the systematic and planned murder of civilians, the one charge that 
could have distinguished this trial from all the others—genocide—was 
not included in the indictment.34 To be sure, the prosecutors were famil-
iar with the term “genocide” at the time they wrote the indictment. Gen-
ocide as a legal concept had been brought to world attention in 1944 
with the publication of Raphael Lemkin’s book, Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe; simultaneously, the crime was in the process of being codified 
by the United Nations when the Einsatzgruppen trial was in progress.35 
Lemkin was also intent to have the term not only recognized, but also 
employed at Nuremberg. As a Polish-Jewish survivor and an expert in 
international criminal law, Lemkin was a tenacious lobbyist of the new 
term he coined in 1944. When he learned of the American decision to 
hold war crimes trials, he became determined to disseminate his ideas 
and, in the spring of 1945, he got a job with the War Crimes Office of 
the Judge Advocate General working at the Pentagon to analyze evi-
dence against Nazi war criminals.36 He took advantage of his new posi-
tion when, two days after President Truman appointed Supreme Court 
Justice Robert H. Jackson to head up the American war crimes program, 
Lemkin wrote to the Chief Justice informing him about the publication 
of his book.37 Lemkin’s timing was impeccable. The Judge Advocate 
General decided Lemkin was the perfect man to assist Jackson in draft-
ing an indictment against the major Nazi war criminals to be tried be-
fore the IMT. In the summer of 1945, Lemkin went to London and 
worked for several months with Jackson and a team of legal experts.38 
 
 33. Amended Indictment, supra note 1, at 13–22. 
 34. TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 69. 
 35. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION, 
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79–95 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l 
Peace 2005); see also G.A. Res. 260 (III), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Dec. 9, 1948), http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.htm (codifying geno-
cide).   
 36. See Raphael Lemkin, Writings–Autobiography, in RAPHAEL LEMKIN PAPERS (1947–
1959), microformed on New York Public Library ZL-273 (on file with New York Public Library, 
#83, M-39, Box 1, file 39, reel 2).  
 37. Letter from Raphael Lemkin to Robert H. Jackson (May 4, 1945) (on file with the Li-
brary of Congress). 
 38. John Q. Barrett, Introduction to NUREMBERG AND GENOCIDE: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
DIALOGS 25–26 (Elizabeth Anderson & David M. Crane eds.,2008); JOHN COOPER, RAPHAEL 
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Apparently, Jackson was quite influenced by Lemkin’s newly defined 
crime, as it appears in the IMT indictment in at least two incarnations. 
First, it shows up as a group crime in count one, which laid out the 
group nature of Nazi criminality in a “common plan or conspiracy.” 
This count explained that through membership in the Nazi party and its 
criminal agencies, such as the SA, SS, SD, and Gestapo, individuals can 
be held responsible for group crime.39 Secondly, Lemkin’s ideas found 
their way into count three of the indictment—war crimes.40 In fact, it is 
here that genocide is officially described as “the extermination of racial 
and national groups, against the civilian populations . . . in order to de-
stroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial, or reli-
gious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies and others.”41 Lem-
kin clearly had some influence at Nuremberg, although genocide was 
left out of the most important charge—crimes against humanity.42 Still, 
Lemkin was hopeful that the prosecution would develop this concept at 
trial and perhaps link it to crimes against civilians. Indeed, his ideas 
seem to have caught on with members of the IMT prosecution team and 
the NMT, who had met him in person and/or who read his scholarly 
works as several of the IMT prosecutors invoked the term at the trial of 
the major war criminals, even so they did not impress the tribunal who 
did not mention “genocide” in its judgment. Eager to influence the sub-
sequent generation of Nuremberg jurists, Lemkin went to Germany in 
May 1946 and took the opportunity to lobby for the inclusion of “geno-
cide” as a crime.43 
Even though Lemkin was disappointed that the IMT did not ade-
quately develop the new crime of genocide, he did his best to define and 
reinforce the meaning of genocide with the younger jurists he encoun-
tered at Nuremberg. His efforts seemed to have paid off. While none of 
the NMT prosecutors formally charged the defendants with the novel 
crime of genocide, at least two of the trials made real efforts to employ 
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 41. Indictment Count Three—War Crimes, I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 
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07 EARL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/17  4:45 PM 
106 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 39:95 
the term.44 By the time the Einsatzgruppen trial had begun in the autumn 
of 1947, the word had achieved some recognition, and although prose-
cutors did not formally use the word “genocide” in the case, they “cer-
tainly had in mind that people were killed because they were Jews.”45 
This was unquestionably borne out at trial where the focus was almost 
exclusively on the Jews as special victims of Einsatzgruppen activities 
and Nazi policy. The difference between the Einsatzgruppen case and 
the other two that employed genocide in prosecution is that neither the 
RuSHA trial (Case 8) nor the Medical trial (Case 1) focused exclusively 
on Jewish victims. Rather, both considered Nazi racial and resettlement 
policy, but as it was directed against other victim groups. 
If the Einsatzgruppen trial impacted our historical understanding 
of the Final Solution and how it unfolded, it did not help to advance 
genocide as a legal term. Even though the trial was one of the most 
clear-cut cases of genocide—the opening statement by the prosecution 
stated as much and the vast majority of murders committed by the per-
petrators was against one victim group, the Jews—the attorneys never 
pursued a line of questioning that would lead to the development of a 
usable definition for international law or history.46 In fact, the opposite 
occurred. Crimes against humanity was the main charge against the de-
fendants but, based on its description in the indictment, the prosecutors 
did not need to prove that the individual acts of murder committed by 
the defendants were part of a larger group crime. Instead, the prosecu-
tion only needed to show that an individual defendant had ordered or 
participated in an individual and seemingly disconnected incident of 
mass murder.47 As a result of the indictment the prosecutors made no at-
tempt to show that the murders the defendants had participated in con-
stituted a systematic program of murdering Jews; it was accepted as 
fact.48 
Today, genocide is described in the UN Charter as the deliberate 
and systematic attempt by one group to kill, in whole or in part, another 
racial, religious, or ethnic group. This is not how crimes against human-
ity were prosecuted at Nuremberg, not even against the Einsatzgruppen 
 
 44. Earl, supra note 42, at 17 (case 1 against the Nazi doctors and Case 8 against members 
of the Race and Resettlement office both invoked genocide to describe the crimes of the defend-
ants).  
 45. Interview with Benjamin B. Ferencz (Apr. 24, 1997). 
 46. Opening Statement of the Prosecution, IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 30–31 (U.S. 
Gov’t Printing Office Oct. 1946–Apr. 1949). 
 47. Amended Indictment, supra note 1, at 15–20.  
 48. Id. 
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leaders who arguably formed a very distinct group and whose sole task 
was to kill other distinct groups. No effort whatsoever was made to ex-
plicate the group nature of the crime. This is largely because crimes 
against humanity were liberally defined to include individual murder. 
Thus, the prosecution relied on tried and true methods of criminal pros-
ecution that enabled them to secure convictions on an individual basis. 
This may have been a wise course of action; after all, prosecutors in in-
ternational criminal tribunals today have great difficulty securing con-
victions for genocide because the burden of proof is so high that it is 
difficult to illustrate an individual perpetrator’s intention to destroy the 
group.49 
The most famous instance maybe that of Slobodan Milošević. Be-
fore his death in March 2006, Milošević taunted ICTY prosecutors by 
daring them to prove that he had “intended” to kill Bosnian Serbs. Of 
course the prosecutors never had the opportunity to do so because he 
died before the conclusion of the trial. Importantly, the “intention to de-
stroy the group” is what distinguishes crimes against humanity from 
genocide today. By opting to prosecute defendants along more tradi-
tional criminal lines, the attorneys ensured an extremely high rate of 
conviction, and in the case of the Einsatzgruppen trial, near perfect. 
Even though the Einsatzgruppen trial introduced the world to a fairly 
thorough description of genocide, in the end, the issue was largely 
avoided as a legal concept, and the prosecutors thereby missed an early 
opportunity to develop it as such. 
IV. OHLENDORF’S NARRATIVE OF THE FÜHRERBEFEHL AND ITS IMPACT(S) 
As the only trial to deal exclusively with crimes against Jews, the 
Einsatzgruppen case occupies a special place in our understanding of 
the history of the Final Solution. The narrative of events, as they were 
explicated after the war, is based largely on trial testimony from the Nu-
remberg courtroom—in particular, the testimony given by the lead de-
fendant, Otto Ohlendorf. Important to the historical record, the details of 
Ohlendorf’s testimony went unchallenged. Perhaps a less enigmatic per-
son would have been questioned more rigorously by the court, but not 
Ohlendorf. Ohlendorf controlled proceedings in the courtroom from his 
very first appearance in 1946, when he was a witness for the prosecu-
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LAW IN RWANDA AND ARUSHIA (Routledge 2010); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN 
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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ICTY AND ICTR PRECEDENTS (Martinus Nijhoff 2006). 
07 EARL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/17  4:45 PM 
108 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 39:95 
tion at the IMT. He (and his crimes) commanded attention and few 
doubted the veracity of his pre-trial confessions or trial testimony, even 
the presiding judge felt he was the “very personification of . . . truth.”50 
More important than what Ohlendorf said about individual Nazi 
personnel was what he said regarding the genesis and timing of the Fi-
nal Solution. He especially targeted how it was carried out, when it was 
decided as policy, and who made the decision. Not insignificantly, these 
questions formed the core of the Einsatzgruppen trial. Because the pros-
ecution had no documentation, whatsoever, they looked to the defend-
ants for answers to prove who ordered the murders, when they were or-
dered, or under what circumstances. More than any of the co-accused, 
the court believed Ohlendorf because his knowledge of events appeared 
most authoritative. 
Why was Ohlendorf’s testimony so compelling? Part of the reason 
was his gift of speech, and according to his contemporaries, he was also 
charming, well-mannered, and smart. Undoubtedly many of the major 
war criminals were intelligent, but according to Nuremberg psycholo-
gists, Ohlendorf was among the brightest in custody, having one of the 
highest IQs of any of the Nuremberg defendants.51 Reminiscent of a 
modern-day celebrity, Ohlendorf attracted attention. People were ghoul-
ishly fascinated by him and the crimes he had committed, and they 
came to court specifically to see him.52 Quite simply, Ohlendorf was a 
young, articulate and unwavering defendant who captivated his audi-
ence. No one, especially not the presiding judge, Michael Musmanno, 
doubted he was a reliable source of information. 
What did Ohlendorf have to say? According to one British intelli-
gence report Ohlendorf was determined to explain every detail of his 
experiences during the life of the Reich. He was, the report explains, 
“quite ready to give details of his organisation and . . . condemn fellow 
Nazis. He asked for one hour to explain the development of the SD and 
its place in the Nazi Party. This intimate session, which he begged for 
repeatedly, had to be denied him for lack of time.”53 There was ample 
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 53. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Second Preliminary Interrogation 
Report of G-2 Special Sections (June, 10 1945), in RECORDS OF THE ARMY STAFF, RECORDS OF 
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opportunity for Ohlendorf to tell the story of the Einsatzgruppen and 
their role in the Final Solution. After all, he was arrested in May 1945 
and was not indicted until July 1947. This gave him more than two 
years, forty interrogations, and three war crimes trials to disclose the 
way the Reich functioned and how policy unfolded. He never ran out of 
new information to tell his interrogators and often remembered forgot-
ten details in subsequent meetings. Whether or not this was a survival 
strategy is difficult to tell; what is for certain is that Ohlendorf never 
seemed to tire of talking. Nor did his captors seem to tire of asking him 
questions when they interrogated him more than three dozen times. Pri-
or to October 1945, the main focus of his discussions was organization-
al (structural); after October, though, the focus shifted to the war on the 
eastern front and the role of the Einsatzgruppen in the extermination 
policy of the Reich that Ohlendorf noted matter-of-factly, had begun be-
fore the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.54 
The genesis of orders to the Einsatzgruppen is a source of some 
debate among historians, and of interest to legal scholars largely be-
cause of its relationship to the issue of intention. In 1945, Ohlendorf 
stated in no uncertain terms that the decision to “exterminate all Jews” 
had been made before June 1941 “by Hitler directly,” and that Himmler 
had repeated Hitler’s orders orally on two occasions—once in May 
1941 (four weeks before the Einsatzgruppen were deployed), and again 
in September when he visited the front.55 Ohlendorf made it perfectly 
clear who had been in charge of operations. For example, when asked to 
clarify exactly how much leeway Einsatzgruppen leaders had in the 
course of their daily operations, he was adamant: they had no independ-
ence and operated under strict “orders . . . from Berlin.”56 The 
Einsatzgruppen, Ohlendorf explained, were controlled by higher author-
ities; Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich were their bosses and because of 
this, the individual leaders of the four units had no room for manoeu-
vre.57 Ohlendorf remained faithful to this story during his entire incar-
ceration. 
When Ohlendorf disclosed that Hitler’s Führerbefehl order—to 
murder all Soviet Jews, men, women, and children—was issued before 
the deployment of the groups in June 1941, no one doubted him because 
 
 54. Summary, Morning Interrogation of Otto Ohlendorf (October 24, 1945), supra note 17, 
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 55. Id.; Summary, Evening Interrogation of Ohlendorf, supra note 21, at 7–8, 14–15; see 
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 56. Summary, Evening Interrogation of Ohlendorf, supra note 21, at 7–8. 
 57. Id.; Summary, Morning Interrogation of Otto Ohlendorf (October 24, 1945), supra note 
17, at 1–2. 
07 EARL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/17  4:45 PM 
110 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 39:95 
of the lack of documented facts available to the prosecution. This rein-
forced the prosecution’s pre-existing ideas about the hierarchy of the 
Third Reich. It especially reinforced their assumption that all decisions 
pertaining to racial policy and the Jews had come directly from Hitler.58 
The timing of the order was also not questioned. As a legal defense, 
lawyers cited the order to justify, excuse, and explain the behavior of 
their clients in Russia. After all, obedience to superior-orders was one of 
their principal defenses. 
On the other hand, the judges and the prosecutors also saw super-
orders as integral to the trial because they believed it was the directive 
that was at the heart of Hitler’s racial war against the Jews. Depending 
on which side of the case one was on, the Führerbefehl proved that the 
defendants were not responsible, and thus, legally innocent before the 
indictment (because they were following superior orders) or, according 
to the prosecution, that they were guilty because it meant there had been 
a racial war directed specifically at the Jews.  Regardless of which side 
of the case one was on, the fact was that both sides argued that the order 
to murder the Jews was given before the Einsatzgruppen were deployed 
on June 22, 1941, and it came directly from Hitler. Once the court ac-
cepted the Führerbefehl as fact, they could make their case that the 
murder of Soviet Jews was not accidental, but rather premeditated by 
Hitler and intended to eradicate the entire Jewish population of Soviet 
Russia, perhaps even Europe—in what we call genocide today.59 The 
proof of the crime was contained within the so-called Einsatzgruppen 
reports, which the prosecution entered as evidence because they detailed 
the exact number of murders, which the prosecution then linked to Hit-
ler’s long standing anti-Semitism, making a clear causal link between 
Hitler’s hatred of the Jews and the Einsatzgruppen’s murder of them. 
As the prosecution made clear to the court, “[t]he actions of the 
Einsatzgruppen in the conquered territories will demonstrate the pur-
pose for which they were organized,” namely the genocidal mass mur-
der of “undesirable” groups.60 
The issue of the Führerbefehl order to murder all Jews is extreme-
ly important to our historical understanding of the genesis of the Final 
Solution. Similarly, the Einsatzgruppen trial is central to the establish-
ment of the intentionalist (premeditated) narrative, illustrating that the 
courtroom has had a significant impact on history. For example, in Hil-
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berg’s original 1961 edition of Destruction, he seems to take Ohlen-
dorf’s claims at face value. He writes, “How was the killing phase 
brought about? Basically, we are dealing with two of Hitler’s decisions. 
One order was given in the spring of 1941, during the planning of the 
invasion of the USSR; it provided that small units of the SS and Police 
be dispatched to Soviet territory, where they were to move from town to 
town to kill all Jewish inhabitants on the spot. This method may be 
called the “the mobile killing operations.”61 Clearly, the trial seems to 
have influenced interpretations. Not only did it make perfect sense that 
the Einsatzgruppen would be informed of their tasks before they were 
deployed, but also because other defendants reinforced Ohlendorf’s 
claims that the Einsatzgruppen were organized for the express purpose 
of killing Jews. For instance, Walter Blume, head of Sonderkommando 
7a in 1941, claimed that “during the setting-up of the Einsatzgruppen 
and Einsatzkommandos during the months of May–June 1941. . . we 
were already being instructed about the tasks of exterminating the 
Jews,” implying that Nazi plans had targeted Jews specifically and in 
advance of the invasion.62 The testimony of the participants was con-
vincing and meshed perfectly with the prosecution’s view of the events 
and the motivation of the Nazis for carrying out a genocide. Therefore, 
it should not be surprising that historians were influenced by this inter-
pretation. 
Another interpretive and highly contentious issue to come out of 
the Einsatzgruppen trial concerns how the victims were perceived to 
have behaved in reaction to deportations and almost certain death, like 
in the Einsatzgruppen executions, instead of how the perpetrators per-
ceived the victims. When asked, many perpetrators told the courts at 
Nuremberg that the victims went to their deaths passively and without 
any resistance whatsoever. The idea of the passive victim has been rein-
forced with the images that have emerged subsequently, often taken il-
legally and by members of the killing squads themselves, which depicts 
the Jewish victims docilely waiting to be deported or shot by 
Einsatzgruppen personnel. We have also heard accounts of the orderly 
lines of people marching to the crematoria in Auschwitz without so 
much as a single person stepping out of line. As Emmanual Ringelblum 
so passionately asked after the clearing of the Warsaw ghetto, “why 
didn’t we resist when they began to resettle 300,000 Jews from War-
 
 61. HILBERG, supra note 13, at 177. 
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saw? Why did we allow ourselves to be led like sheep to the slaughter? 
Why did everything come so easy to the enemy? Why didn’t the hang-
men suffer a single casualty?”63 
Hilberg had early answers to these troubling questions, but they 
were not well received by the Jewish community as the political scien-
tist conceived of Jewish passivity due to 2000 years of Jewish history. 
According to his fatalistic reading, European Jewry had learned that if 
they waited long enough the persecution would end and they could re-
sume their normal lives once again.64 History then, was responsible for 
the complete lack of resistance we see in the photographic images of the 
killing process.65 Not surprisingly, Hilberg’s interpretation set off a his-
toriographical firestorm, which still rages today. It was taken up most 
famously by Hannah Arendt in her discussion regarding the role of the 
Jewish councils.66 The question is, “What evidence did Hilberg use to 
draw these conclusions?” Tellingly, it all came from the perpetrators, 
found in the Einsatzgruppen trial materials and other Nuremberg trials 
documents. There are numerous examples in which the perpetrators 
claim that the victims did not resist or fight back, but rather complied 
with their orders to line-up and be shot. For example, in a discussion of 
Einsatzgruppen D’s use of the gas van, Ohlendorf insisted that the vic-
tims had lined up and entered the gas vans without any resistance and 
had felt nothing in the process of being killed.67 In terms of “resettle-
ment,” as an effective means of pacification, the Einsatzgruppen relied 
on the Jewish councils and local committee members to identify victims 
and gather them for transportation to death camps since the Jews implic-
itly trusted their community leaders.68 We also know that Hilberg’s in-
terpretation is highly problematic because it duplicates perpetrator per-
ceptions by displaying a peculiar lack of Quellenkritik in one of the 
otherwise most scrupulous researchers of the Holocaust. We have ample 
evidence to suggest that victims were not oblivious to their fate, nor 
were the killing processes pain-free. The scholarship on this topic has 
changed substantially in the years since the first publication of Hilberg’s 
Destruction, and historians have convincingly shown it was shock and 
paralysis, rather than fatalism and absence of resolve, which accounts 
for the apparent lack of resistance. The irony is that the stereotype of 
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 64. Id. at 662–63. 
 65. See Id. at 662–69. 
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07 EARL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/17  4:45 PM 
2017] Legacies of Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen after 70 Years 113 
Jewish passivity was doubly promoted in the trial. First by Ohlendorf 
and his co-defendants and second by the prosecution, whose decision to 
try their case by documents ensured that the perpetrators’ were the only 
voices in the courtroom. 
V. CONCLUSION 
From our understanding, the events of 1941 and their relationship 
to the Final Solution is clearly embedded in the legal process. What 
matters in criminal law is proving the facts of the crime. In the 
Einsatzgruppen trial, the issue that mattered to the prosecution was that 
civilians had been killed in record numbers by the defendants, not the 
issue of when the decision to kill them was made. The defendants were 
commanders of the killings and testified that the mass murder of Jews 
was a direct result of an order from Hitler. The order had been decided 
before the invasion of the Soviet Union was initiated and disseminated 
by Himmler and Heydrich. These facts were never questioned. Rather, 
the emphasis during cross-examination was on why the defendants par-
ticipated in the killing process, what brought them to it, and how they 
felt about it. The issue was not how, when, or from whom the decision 
was made. 
Witness testimony and the way the prosecution interprets it is inte-
gral to the historians’ craft. The tone and tenor of witness testimony and 
the cross-examination of the witnesses factor into our professional 
judgment about the events under question just as much as the supporting 
documents of a case do. As Christopher Browning astutely observed 
when he was working with trial documents, the believability of witness-
es is on a case-by-case basis, and ultimately, it is up to the individual 
historian who is using the court records.69 The fact is that war crimes tri-
als are oral forums, where a defendant’s public performance, as much as 
the documentation used to try him, impacts the courts view of events. 
Just like historians, courts of law privilege documentation over oral tes-
timony. However, if the court has no documentary evidence, facts are 
established through the direct testimony of witnesses. And just like the 
way in which historians exercise their judgment, the court determines 
what is and what is not true or believable. 
In the case of the timing and nature of the Führerbefehl, the court 
had no documentation about these issues, but they did have an articu-
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late, smart, and verbose witness whose version of events seemed relia-
ble. Even before the trial began, the prosecution had already made up 
their mind when they accepted as fact Ohlendorf’s version of events 
concerning the organization of the Einsatzgruppen and the nature and 
timing of their orders. The Führerbefehl claim fit perfectly with the 
prosecutors’ belief that the actions of the Einsatzgruppen had been part 
of a master plan to intentionally and systematically exterminate the 
Jews and take over Europe. In a civilian court, this would have been a 
clear case of first-degree murder. In the court at Nuremberg, it proved 
easily that these men were guilty of crimes against humanity and it is 
this intentionalist narrative that historians subsequently embraced. 
There can be little doubt that in the history of the Holocaust, the 
Einsatzgruppen trial occupies an important place. The trial provides a 
relatively in-depth and descriptive narrative of the crimes perpetrated in 
Russia and the Baltic states during World War II that came directly 
from the perpetrators themselves and in a relatively accurate fashion, 
supporting Lawrence Douglas’s claim that war crimes trials can succeed 
both legally and didactically.70 This trial highlighted central planning as 
a feature of genocide, which is a historically contentious claim. Yet be-
yond that, the trial also proved that central planning does not nullify the 
role of human agency in carrying out those orders either legally or mor-
ally. The perpetrators themselves admitted that they could refuse orders 
and sometimes without repercussion. The legal and procedural norms 
that governed the Einsatzgruppen trial may have distorted our historical 
understanding of certain elements of the Final Solution, but the law did 
not get everything wrong. Broadly speaking, it recognized the racial 
crimes of the Third Reich were not solely the responsibility of one man; 
rather, it highlighted just how many people and agencies were required 
to carry out Hitler’s vision. This has had a significant impact on the way 
atrocity trials are prosecuted today.71 As the Einsatzgruppen trial so 
clearly illustrates, trials of these perpetrators were an attempt by the 
Americans to redeem the tragedies of World War II and that practice 
continues in American-influenced international and national courts. 
Mischaracterized sometimes as “victor’s justice”, Nuremberg was 
the first time in history that other governments held major and minor 
 
 70. LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN 
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 71. G.A. Res. 260 (III), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Gen-
ocide, at Art. 4 (Dec. 9, 1948), http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.htm (“Persons committing 
genocide of any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether they are con-
stitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”). 
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leaders of a legitimate government accountable for crimes committed 
during wartime. Although law has always been important in the west, 
Nuremberg was infused with a moral task. Not only did the planners 
want to punish individual Nazis, they also wanted to teach Germans a 
lesson by showing them the government they supported was evil, and 
showing democracy was a better form of governance than authoritarian-
ism. They wanted Germans to become democrats.  They believed the 
best way to do this was to publicly illustrate that liberal democratic jus-
tice could be fair. They would do this by using law. Thus, I would ar-
gue, Nuremberg was accompanied by a real sense of American ideal-
ism; a form of optimism rooted in a faith in the transformative power of 
law. And that faith, I would argue, is still with us today. 
 
